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Chinese literature and its significance or insignifi-cance is a continued subject of heated debate inChina. From May Fourth, when anti-traditionalist
thinkers called on literature to assume a pioneering role in
transforming subjects into citizens, to its use as propaganda
during World War Two and on both sides of the Strait after
1949, it was seen as a crucial vector of political ideas. Dur-
ing the “Enlightenment” of the 1980s, literature was again
called upon to play a central – though politically very differ-
ent – role in helping society come to terms with the officially
still taboo traumas of the Cultural Revolution. However,
“Enlightenment” this time was not only synonymous with
anti-traditionalism: critical reflection on the iconoclasm of
the Cultural Revolution, emphasizing literature’s role as a
moral conscience, also led to an enthusiastic rediscovery of
cultural tradition, often against May Fourth ideals, among
the writers of the “roots” (xungen) movement. It was only in
the aftermath of the failed Tiananmen protests of 1989 that
younger writers began to substantially question the need for
literature to play a central role in society and in intellectual
debate. 
Perhaps inevitably, while its significant social role was ex-
tolled, debates about Chinese literature were routinely ac-
companied by anguished doubts about its intrinsic, aesthetic,
or intellectual value, whether because of its alleged break
(voluntary or as the result of an irresistible historical trend)
with Chinese tradition or, on the contrary, because of its
continued subordination of aesthetic autonomy – viewed as
a defining aspect of the “high modernism” that ensures writ-
ers international recognition – to socio-political concerns.
Soul-searching about why Chinese writers did or did not de-
serve a Nobel Prize for Literature took place throughout the
1980s and into the 1990s, with official organs such as the
Writers’ Association actively lobbying on behalf of members
such as Ba Jin and Ai Qing. Liu Xiaobo on the other hand,
then the “angry young man” of Chinese literary criticism, in
a talk at the literature Research Institute of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (chaired by Liu Zaifu) in 1986
and several subsequent articles attacking “scar literature”
and the roots writers, also called for an end to Chinese writ-
ers’ “childish” obsession with the Nobel Prize. (1)
Liu Zaifu, in a series of articles written on the eve of the
hundredth anniversary of the literature prize, underscored
the long history and great value of Chinese literature and un-
abashedly called for international institutional recognition of
its qualities before the Prize's count of years reached one
hundred. (2) Writing about his visit to Sweden at the invita-
tion of Göran Malmqvist, Liu discusses the merits of Lu
Xun, Li Jieren, and Shen Congwen before going on to men-
tion contemporary authors Bei Dao, Gao Xingjian, and Li
Rui as favourites of Malmqvist. The Swedish academy’s
choice of Gao Xingjian the very next year as the laureate of
the one hundredth anniversary prize appeared to many as a
carefully balanced rejoinder to these criticisms: while award-
ing the prize to a culturally and linguistically Chinese writer
who, although he had lived in China for almost 50 years and
written largely within the context of contemporary Chinese
literature, now held French citizenship and also wrote in
French, the Nobel committee seemed to be explicitly reject-
ing, just as Gao had in his own essays, the idea that the
Nobel prize should be “representative” in any way of a na-
tion-state or its literary field. At first, there seems to have
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1. See Wendy Larson and Richard Kraus, “China’s Writers, the Nobel Prize, and the
International Politics of Literature,” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no.
21 (Jan., 1989), pp. 143-160. The authors detail the story of the Jinshan confer-
ence in November 1986 near Shanghai, to which the Chinese authorities invited
Göran Malmqvist, who had just joined the Nobel Academy (pp. 13-14). See also Liu
Xiaobo’s articles “Weiji! Xin shiqi wenxue mianlin weiji” (Crisis! The Literature of
the New Age is Facing a Crisis), Shenzhen qingnianbao, 3 October 1986 and “Zai
lun xin shiqi wenxue mianlin weiji: guanyu ‘Weiji’ yiwen de jidian buchong”
(Another discussion about the crisis faced by literature in the new era: a few addi-
tional points to “Crisis”), Baijia, No. 1, 1988, p. 12-26 (quoted by Larson and Kraus,
art. cit., p. 152-153). See also Geremie Barmé, “Confession, Redemption, and
Death: Liu Xiaobo and the Protest Movement of 1989” in George Hicks (ed.), The
Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen, London, Longmans, 1990, pp. 52-99.
2. See Liu Zaifu, “Bai nian Nuobei’er wenxue jiang he Zhongguo zuojia de quexi” (One
hundred years of Nobel Prize and the absence of Chinese writers), Lianhe wenxue,
1999 (in particular parts VI on Republican authors, VII on contemporary Chinese
authors, and VIII on Taiwanese and Hong Kong authors). Available online on Liu
Zaifu’s blog at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4cd081e90100f8bg.html (28 May
2010).
3. The Foreign ministry spokesperson declared that the choice of Gao “shows again
the Nobel Literature Prize has been used for ulterior political motives, and it is not
worth commenting on.” The Writers’ Association spokesperson Jin Jianfan react-
ed as follows: “He [Gao] is French and not Chinese and the reason he won the
award is more political than literary. There are hundreds of Chinese writers who
are better than him, which proves that the committee is very ignorant.” See
“Beijing attacks ‘political’ literature award,” BBC News, 13 October 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/970184.stm. To add a personal anecdote, when
the Nobel Prize was announced, I happened to be teaching in the French
Department of Beijing Foreign Studies University, Gao’s alma mater and former
department, where several colleagues remembered him well. When the official
verdict was handed down, at least one of Gao’s former colleagues, based on his
earlier memories, began holding forth to all and sundry (in particular his students)
about Gao’s bad language skills in French, which he assumed to be the language
in which his novels had been written. This proved beyond doubt, in his opinion, the
political nature of the prize that had been awarded.
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been significant tension within the Chinese literary-political
establishment as to how to react to the Nobel Prize (an-
nounced on 12 October 2000): the nominal president of the
writers’ association was still Ba Jin, who at 96 and in ill
health could not, or at any rate did not, speak out. The gov-
ernment came out against the prize, denouncing the acad-
emy’s decision as political and branding the recipient as a
French writer (October 13), thereby instilling doubts among
many mainland readers, who lacked access to Gao’s most re-
cent texts and in particular his two novels, as to whether he
still wrote in Chinese. (3) However, Premier Zhu Rongji, in
the course of a long press conference held during a visit to
Japan on the evening of October 14, congratulated the lau-
reate as well as the French Ministry for Culture, perhaps be-
cause he was not sufficiently informed of the line decided in
Beijing, or because he personally disagreed with it. (4) Oth-
ers, including critics Liu Zaifu and writer Mo Yan, congrat-
ulated Gao Xingjian, echoing the resounding endorsement
of the prize in Hong Kong and especially Taiwan, where
Gao Xingjian has now achieved cult-like status.
More importantly, the prize reignited a century-old polemic
on Chinese literature’s “special relationship” with the nation
and its difficulty in attaining universal significance, well
know to Western critics through the strongly worded views
of C. T. Hsia. Hsia, whose History of Modern Chinese Fic-
tion was first published in 1961, bluntly stated in his after-
word to the third edition in 1999 that the “obsession with
China” that in his view characterises modern Chinese liter-
ature allows it, at best, to share –“a spiritual affinity with the
most significant modern Western literature, despite its ex-
plicit denial of universality.” (5) At the other end of the ideo-
logical spectrum, Fredric Jameson, after visiting Beijing in
1986, famously averred that because it always speaks for the
oppressed national community as a whole, “the Third World
novel will not offer the satisfactions of Proust or Joyce; what
is more damaging than that perhaps, is its tendency to re-
mind us of outmoded stages of our own first-world cultural
development.” (6) Julia Lovell, the first Western scholar to de-
vote a book-length study to “China’s quest for a Nobel Prize
in literature,” similarly focuses on what she views as the
Nobel committee’s hypocrisy in highlighting the “universal
value” of Gao’s writings while in fact rewarding his stance as
a “closet dissident” who, despite his ostensible stance as an
apolitical writer of non-national literature, in fact remains
“obsessed with China” (and therefore, no doubt, unworthy
of the prize). (7) Regardless of how one judges the quality of
Gao’s writing, or modern Chinese literature in general, one
cannot help wondering if there is not an implicit misunder-
standing in these pronouncements: the universal appeal of a
literary work is surely not incompatible with an author’s deep
engagement with one (or even possibly more than one) par-
ticular society or culture. In any case, it is safe to conclude
that the 2000 Nobel Prize did not put an end to the polemics
about the international position of Chinese literature, but
only fanned them further, with Gao Xingjian’s name even
being omitted from some lists of Nobel laureates in China. (8)
More recently, one might add, discussion of the value of
Chinese literature was rekindled by an interview with Ger-
man sinologist Wolfgang Kubin for the Chinese-language
service of German broadcaster Deutsche Welle in the fall of
2006, in which Kubin criticised – in no uncertain terms –
excessive Western interest in contemporary Chinese fiction
(in particular what he described as commercial fiction such
as works by Wei Hui and Mian Mian), to the detriment of
other genres such as contemporary poetry and Republican
fiction. The huge impact that this rather brief interview with
an obscure European public radio broadcaster sparked in
China (9) once again revealed the importance, in the eyes of
4. This was reported in a Hong Kong pro-Beijing newspaper: “Zhu Rongji miaoyu huajie
bairen jienan” (Zhu Rongji’s elegant words defuse one hundred reproving questions),
Dongfang Ribao (Oriental Daily), 15 October 2000, p. A8. Zhu Rongji is quoted as follows:
“I am very pleased that a literary œuvre written in Chinese was awarded the Nobel Prize.
Chinese characters have a history of several thousand years and the Chinese language
has an inexhaustible appeal; I feel confident that more literary works written in Chinese
or one of the Chinese languages [hanyu huo huayu] will be rewarded in the future. […]
It is inevitable [that the prize be politically tendentious]; the judgments made in award-
ing a literary prize always have a certain human or even political background. This isn’t
worth criticising; I think anyone with a brain may form their own judgment.” The end of
the interview is reprinted in a wire from the dissident news agency Renminbao, available
online: http://renminbao.com/rmb/articles/2000/10/14/4458pb.html (28 May 2010). This
report was subsequently denied by the Chinese government. 
5. C. T. Hsia, “Obsession with China: The moral burden of Chinese literature,” A History of
Modern Chinese Fiction, 3rd ed., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. 536-7.
It is unfortunate that while this study, which bears a deep imprint of Cold War aesthetics,
is viewed with increasing circumspection in the West, it has gained wide currency in
China as the standard “Western” narrative of the rise of modern Chinese literature. 
6. Fredric Jameson, “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational capitalism,” Social
Text, no. 15 (1986), p. 65.
7. Julia Lovell, The Politics of Cultural Capital, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2006.
“The Nobel committee, which claims to be honoring a Chinese writer for his ‘universal
validity,’ only mentions by name his works related to China, which happens to be one of
the last great stumbling blocks to the global victory of liberal democratic capitalism.” (p.
178) 
8. See Kuang Mingyan, Zhang Jun (eds), Nuobeier wenxue jiang mingzhu sudu (The great
works of the Nobel Prize for literature: a fast reader), Beijing, Huawen chubanshe, 2009.
The book provides extracts from works of all laureates from 1901 to 2008, but does not
mention the 2000 laureate even by name. Similarly, a long interview conducted by
Southern Weekend during Gao’s visit to Hong Kong in 2008 remained unpublished. 
9. See, for example, the articles collected on the blog East South North West:
http://www.zonaeuropa. com/culture/c20061214_1.htm (28 May 2010). Southern
Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo) continuously treated the subject with interest, publishing a
substantial analysis of Kubin’s views by Swedish sinologist Torbjorn Lodén and Peking
University Professor Chen Pingyuan on 5 April 2007 (cover of the culture section), and
another long interview with W. Kubin on 27 November 2008, entitled “Xiandai xing wan-
quan shi yige cuowu: Gubin yan zhong de 20 shiji Zhongguo wenxue” (Modernity was a
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many Chinese intellectuals, of worldwide recognition for lit-
erature written in their language or their country. Inciden-
tally, Kubin on this occasion dismissed a question about the
value of Gao Xingjian’s writing as “a joke.” (10) Most recently,
the 2009 Frankfurt Book Fair, at which “China” was invited
as “guest of honour,” once more stoked passions when cer-
tain writers were not included in the official delegation. (11)
While these discussions are revealing and stimulating, the
present feature takes an explicitly non-normative approach to
literature, including to the texts themselves. Polemics such as
those surrounding the Nobel Prize or W. Kubin’s views are
reminiscent of a time in which the study of literature was de-
voted to demonstrating its “beauty,” and literature as a disci-
pline was a branch of aesthetics rather than of social sci-
ences. Much of the indignation about the Nobel Prize
(awarded, no less, by a group of old, white, European males
who purport to “judge” the merits of world literature) stems
from excessive naivety as to the pureness of its ideals – it is
after all, as Zhu Rongji slyly suggested, not different from
other, often hotly disputed, literary prizes and their intrigues,
including in China (the four-yearly Mao Dun prize probably
tops the list). In these post-Bourdieusian, post-Jaussian
times, most scholars have come to work with a far more pro-
saic understanding of literary texts and their institutional sta-
tus, which is not seen to be derived from visionary philo-
sophical insights couched in aesthetically sublime forms by a
prophet-like writer in the romantic tradition, but as a com-
plex interaction between social expectations and representa-
tions, the cultural “field,” and its power plays.
However, these debates have raised welcome questions
about the self-representation of Chinese literature and its
place in the world, in a context in which the relevance of lit-
erature itself to the contemporary world is constantly called
into doubt. The outcry in China over the Nobel Prize, in
strong contrast with Taiwan and Hong Kong speaks to the
continued expectation in official circles that literature must
be “representative” of the nation. In an interview conducted
by Julia Lovell, Lao She’s son Shu Yi, then director of the
National Literature Museum, exclaims: “Why don’t they
give the Prize to China?” (12), in a striking contrast with the
Nobel committee’s own statements that prizes are purely in-
dividual, and even explicit desire to reward individuals some-
how at odds with their nation. (13)
Similarly, Wolfgang Kubin’s views are of interest not be-
cause they disqualify contemporary fiction, but because they
raise certain substantive questions: in this respect the often
sympathetic echo of Kubin’s views in the Chinese press can
be seen as a manifestation of not only a secular inferiority
complex, but also an ongoing concern among Chinese intel-
lectuals about certain trends in contemporary society (includ-
ing, but not limited to, China), such as commercialisation,
intellectual parochialism, and reverence for officialdom and
state-sanctioned culture. Kubin highlights the lack of “cos-
mopolitanism” among contemporary Chinese writers, con-
trasting them with their Republican-era predecessors, who
often read news and fiction from around the world. (14) He
finds fault with Chinese literature’s continued subordination
to politics (after 1949) and now also to commercial success
(since 1992): because of institutions such as the Writers’ As-
sociation (recently buttressed by a move to include young
best-selling authors such as Guo Jingming), (15) no contempo-
rary writer living in China has tackled issues such as Tibet
or Tiananmen. Like more than a few Chinese writers,
Kubin deplores the corruption of the Chinese language by
bureaucratic Mao-speak, which he likens to German under
the Third Reich (in an implicit reference to Victor Klem-
perer’s seminal study Lingua Tertii Imperii), a problem he
believes is compounded by the lack of proper editorial work
by Chinese publishers. He points to the contemporary novel
10. “Deguo hanxuejia quanwei lingwai yizhi yan kan xiandangdai Zhongguo wenxue”
(German authoritative sinologist casts a different eye on modern and contemporary
Chinese literature), Deutsche Welle, 11 November 2006, http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,2249278,00.html (28 May 2010).
11. German weekly Die Zeit has compiled an excellent online feature on the Book Fair avail-
able at : http://www.zeit.de/themen/kultur/frankfurter-buchmesse-2009/index (31 May
2010).
12. Julia Lovell, The Politics of Cultural Capital, op. cit., p. 179-180.
13. In this respect, one might equally submit that the Nobel committee has manifested its
own quite consistent agenda over the last quarter of a century (roughly since Wole
Soyinka’s prize in 1986), systematically rewarding writers who are at odds with their
“national culture” and politics: whether “Western” (Dario Fo, Elfriede Jelinek, José
Saramago, Harold Pinter, and others stand out for their critical views on Western democ-
racy, colonialism, and capitalism) or from what is now termed the “non-West”: Orhan
Pamuk, V. S. Naipaul, Naguib Mahfouz, and especially Ōe KenzaburŌ, whose critical
views on Japan seem to have been positively chosen to make up for the Kawabata faux-
pas of 1968 (Wendy Larson describes the Academy’s commending of Kawabata
Yasunari for expressing “the essence of the Japanese Mind” as “racist ignorance”; it is
certainly safe to say that such a pronouncement would no longer be considered politi-
cally correct today; see Wendy Larson, art cit., p. 147).
14. One might rightfully object, as pointed out by Gregory Lee (quoted by Julia Lovell), that
when Pound borrows from China he is hailed as a modernist, but when May Fourth writ-
ers borrowed from the West, their works were dismissed as imitations. Gao has often
suffered from this attitude. See G. Lee, Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Makers,
London, Hurst and Co., 1996, p. 79.
15. When, after Ba Jin’s death, Tie Ning was elected as the new chairperson of the Writers’
Association, she undertook to massively “recruit” young writers and internet writers into
its ranks. Zhang Yueran, Guo Jingming and several other “post-80” stars joined on 27
September 2007 at the invitation of Wang Meng. See Zhang Ying, “Zuoxie ‘kuo zhao’ la”
(The Writers’ Association ‘recruits widely’), Nanfang Zhoumo, 8 November 2011, p. D21.
Han Han characteristically mocked their sycophantic behaviour and stated he would
never join, because “I believe a real artist should always be independent, and never let
himself be enrolled in an organization.” in “Han Han: juedui bu jiaru Zuoxie” (Han Han: I
will absolutely not join the Writers’ Association), Nanfang Zhoumo, 8 November 2011, p.
D22. One may hypothesize that the perennial duality of the Chinese literary scene has
thus been extended to the “post-80s”…











and its continued emulation of “magic realism” by writers
such as Mo Yan – a critique reminiscent of Ziauddin Sardar
(Postmodernism and the other, 1998), who accuses the
genre of repackaging exoticism for post-colonial readers – as
a source of stagnation, in particular the systematic use of al-
legory to convey political messages, which he believes im-
pedes literary innovation. (16)
The choice of Gao Xingjian for this special feature of China
Perspectives therefore relates to his engagement with many
of the issues that have been at the centre of heated debates
over modern Chinese literature, and which is reflected in the
collection of articles. Opening the issue, Noël Dutrait’s
paper is devoted to Gao’s intellectual stance as a writer
“without -isms,” related to what he sees as Chinese litera-
ture’s main problem throughout the twentieth century: its ex-
cessive polarisation by politics and collectives, and the re-
peated injunction for writers to take a stance for or against a
government or ideology, or in defence of China as a nation-
state. This is reminiscent of Li Zehou’s reflection on the re-
peated subordination of “Enlightenment” (qimeng) to “na-
tional salvation” (jiuwang). Gao thus pleads for individuality
and rejects any national dimension to literature, stating his
connexion with China only in terms of language (and even
that attachment is not exclusive, as he also writes in
French). (17)
Sy Ren Quah, re-examining Gao’s “experimental plays” of
the 1980s, finds that a close analysis of how China is
“framed” in The Other Shore reveals subtle allusions to the
Cultural Revolution and other past political traumas of the
People’s Republic. In this, as in other plays, Gao sets him-
self off from more traditional, epic “scar” writers by using
modernist forms to make sense of an absurd series of histor-
ical events. 
Yinde Zhang, in his analysis of Soul Mountain and One
Man’s Bible, situates Gao within the context of roots litera-
ture, also popular in the 1980s, which, as underscored by
Julia Lovell, is a movement usually seen as “fundamentally
implicated in the intellectual search for a strong Chinese
identity” and thus as yet another example of “obsession with
China.” (18) Yinde Zhang, however, highlights the parallel be-
tween forgotten cultures and forgotten historical events, con-
cluding that Gao’s symmetrical quests never provide access
to a stable truth or identity, but rather diffract into complex
constructions of personal experiences of guilt, survival, and
forgetting. 
Sebastian Veg’s article, by comparing Gao with Ōe Kenz-
aburō , attempts to take him out of a purely Chinese context,
while highlighting the distrust, shared by two Asian writers,
of Western modernity, which subordinates the individual to
the nation and culture to development. Despite their differ-
ent attitudes to politics, they both favour a position for the
writer on the social and geographical margins. 
The feature is completed by an unpublished essay by Gao
Xingjian, in which he pleads for a less negative view of his-
tory and artistic creation, one that is not underpinned by
Hegelian and Marxist dialectics. Aesthetic creation, he ar-
gues, should be based on “cognition and recognition” rather
than on dialectic subversion of tradition. (19)
It may seem paradoxical to focus on a writer as “marginal” as
Gao Xingjian to reflect on the status of contemporary litera-
ture in China. (20) However, ten years after the first Chinese-
language Nobel Prize, the controversy shows no sign of abat-
ing, a fact that ultimately speaks to the continued importance
of literature in the intellectual debate in China. •
16. See “Xiandai xing wanquan shi yige cuowu,” art. cit., and “Wolfgang Kubin: le roman-
icer chinois type est un inculte” (The typical Chinese fiction writer has no culture), Books
Magazine, no. 10, November-December 2009, http://www.booksmag.fr/magazine/
a/wolfgang-kubin-le-romancier-chinois-type-est-un-inculte.html (28 May 2010). 
17. Gao Xingjian’s status as a French writer falls outside the scope of this feature: see Claire
Conceison, “The French Gao Xingjian, Bilingualism, and Ballade nocturne,” Xianggang
xiju xuekan (Hong Kong Drama Review), vol. 8 (2009), pp. 303-322.
18. Julia Lovell, op. cit., p. 168.
19. Several of these articles and Gao’s essay were originally presented at a conference co-
organised in 2008 by the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the French Centre for
Research on Contemporary China, with the support of the d’Alembert Fund of the French
Foreign Ministry. The editors would like to express their thanks to Gilbert Fong, the co-
organiser of the conference, and Noël Dutrait for his continued support, as well as to
Jean-Luc Bidaux and C. K. Lam, the librarians responsible for the Gao collections at Aix-
en-Provence and CUHK, Gao Xingjian, Tang Shu-wing and Pierre Haski for providing
illustrations.
20. See also the special issue of Modern Chinese Literature and Culture devoted to Gao in
2002 (vol. 14, no. 2).
